University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

1978

Rules Pertaining to Witnesses
John W. Reed

University of Michigan Law School, reedj@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters/31

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters
Part of the Evidence Commons, Litigation Commons, and the State and Local Government Law
Commons

Publication Information & Recommended Citation
Reed, John W. "Rules Pertaining to Witnesses." In The Michigan Rules of Evidence: A Practice Manual,
edited by R. B. Baxter et al. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 1978.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Book Chapters by an authorized
administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Rules Pertaining to Witnesses
John

w.

Reed

Article VI of the Michigan Rules of Evidence contains the rules dealing with witnesses. Trials bring to
mind testimonial evidence. There surely are other kinds
of evidence, such as docmnents, guns, automobile tires,
chemical substances, and the like. But most evidence
comes from the mouths of witnesses, and even demonstrative evidence usually is admitted only after a witness
has taken the stand and testified to foundation facts.
So it is important and appropriate that we turn to the
provisions of the rules that deal with qualifications
and credibility of witnesses.
I would like to direct your attention to MRE 601 and
603, dealing with the competency of witnesses, and
MRE 602, dealing with the requirement of personal
knowledge. There are affirmative and negative aspects
of competency. On the affirmative side, there are two
requirements. First, Rule 601 requires the physical and
mental capacity: one must have had sight to testify to
what was seen or hearing to testify to what was heard;
the ability to remember what was perceived by these or
the other senses; and the ability to communicate understandably what is remembered. In brief, the important
mental and physiological factors are the abilities to
observe, remember, and communicate. The second affirmative element of competency, stated in Rule 603, is
that the person must be willing to commit himself to
try to tell the truth. In essence it is a moral qualification.
In addition to these affirmative factors, there may
be negative fac_tors that would render incompetent an
195
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otherwise competent witness. For example, in an earlier
day a convicted felon was not competent as a witness
even though he could observe, remember, and communicate
and would promise to tell the truth on this occasion. If
one were a party or the spouse of a party, one could not
testify. Over the years these incompetencies have been
modified, indeed largely eliminated.
With one significant exception, Rules 601, 602, and
603 simply restate prior Michigan law and practice, and
for that matter, with that one significant exception,
they restate the general law and practice in this
regard. Let us look at some of the specific issues
involved in these rules.
The introductory clause of Michigan's Rule 601
incorporates the affirmative aspects of competency.
Incidentally, if a person cannot testify understandably because he doesn't speak the language of the
court, an interpreter is required. There is a slight
change in Michigan practice with respect to interpreters: under MRE 604 interpreters must be sworn and the
court must find that the interpreter is an expert.
Rule 603 states the familiar requirement that the
witness take an oath. The form of the oath is not mandated; it may be in any form that the court will permit
that is calculated to awaken the witness's conscience
and impress on him or her the duty to testify truthfully. Michigan probably does not have an exotic enough
variety of cultures to give rise to the kinds of situations that may arise in places like New York or San
Francisco. I remember hearing about a case in San
Francisco involving a homicide that was the result of
a so-called Tong war. A prospective witness of Chinese
ancestry asked to be allowed to take his oath in the
courtroom over the ringing of the neck of a white
rooster. The symbolism is obvious. There are other
oaths in the Far East where a person blows out a candle
or breaks a cup in the courtroom. It is unlikely that
you will encounter such things in Iron River, but the
point is that the oath does not have to be "So help me,
God." A judge should be willing to do whatever he or she
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believes will extract from the witness an express ion of
understanding the importance of telling the truth and a
commitment to try to do so.
With the witness on the stand having taken the oath,
it is then up to the court to determine the witness's
competence in the affirmative sense. Federal Rule 601
suggests that any witness a lawyer would put on the
witness stand has enough credibility to make it worth
the jury's hearing him, with limitations of ability
being a matter of weight and not of competence. The
Michigan Supreme Court adopted a different version of
Rule 601, which makes possible a determination by the
court that a proposed witness is incompetent. Such a
determination will be rare, of course-typically a very
young child or the mentally ill or retarded person.
We turn now to the negative aspects of competency.
Michigan, like other states, has long since eliminated
such grounds of incompetency as felony convict ions,
marriage to a party, and interest in the outcome. The
only important incompetency remaining appears in the
Dead Man's Statute, which makes a survivor incompetent
to testify to a transaction equally within the knowledge of the deceased. But even that ground has been of
relatively little importance since the 1967 amendment
which made such testimony admissible if corroborated.
Now, by virtue of Rule 601, the Dead Man's Statute is
gone. MRE 601 states that every person is competent to
be a witness "except as otherwise provided in these
rules"-and there is no Dead Man's Statute in the
rules. That is the only significant change in Michigan
practice embodied in MRE 601 and 603.
There are two other incompetencies defined in these
rules, both unsurprising. MRE 605 provides that a judge
cannot testify in a case in which he is presiding. MRE
606 states that a juror cannot testify in a case 1n
which he is sitting as a juror. No objection need be
made to preserve either point.
There is one other important aspect of witness
qualification in Rule 602. A witness may be qualified
physically and mentally and may be perfectly willing
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to abide by an appropriate oath, but, according to Rule
602, he can testify only to those matters about which he
has personal knowledge. Moreover, evidence that he has
such knowledge is a prerequisite, a necessary foundation, to testimony about that matter. For example, a
normally competent witness takes the usual oath and is
asked, "Who ran the red light?" Not only is that bad
advocacy, it violates Rule 602. (Indeed, very often the
rules require, or at least encourage, practice that
the principles of persuasive advocacy would dictate
anyway.) Rule 602 requires that evidence be introduced
"sufficient to support a finding that he has personal
knowledge of the matter." There must be prima facie
evidence that the witness has personal knowledge. An
exception exists for the expert witness who may, for
example, base his opinion on a hypothetical question.
There is, of course, no difference between Rule 602 and
previous Michigan practice.
I turn next to impeachment. To impeach a witness is,
in the traditional phrase, to detract from his credibility. The rules dealing with impeachment are not
exhaustive; there are modes of impeachment not dealt
with. For example, it is certainly permissible to show
a witness's interest in the case, or his bias, yet there
is no rule mentioning it. It is also permissible to
show that the witness has made a prior inconsistent
statement, but again there is no explicit reference in
the rules to that as a legitimate means of impeachment.
The rules do contain reference to the procedure for
showing prior inconsistent statements, but there is no
11
authorizing" provision. As adopted, the impeachment
provisions of the MRE consist simply of a rule governing who may impeach and a series of rules giving
guidance in frequently recurring and particularly
troublesome areas, such as impeachment by character, by
prior conduct, by prior convictions, and by religious
belief.
Under Rule 607 who may impeach? The traditional view
is that one may not impeach one's own witness. The
justifications for this are a combination of theory and
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practicality. In theory, an attorney vouches for the
credibility of the witness he presents and therefore
cannot turn on the witness when his testimony is
disappointing. However, the attorney does not always
have a choice of who his witnesses are, particularly
eyewitnesses to a tort. On the practical side, the
suggest ion was that if the party who calls a witness can
turn on his witness, there will be no one to protect
that witness from attacks on his character and the
1 ike. That is probably fallacious also. The court,
among others, should protect the witness from improper
attack. This traditional rule is widely criticized,
and the federal rules responded to that criticism by
permitting the impeachment of the witness by any party.
The Michigan Supreme Court took the opposite view.
MRE 607 essentially restates the prior traditional
rules on the point. First, the opposing party may
impeach; that is orthodox. Second, the calling party
generally may not impeach his own witness. But he may
impeach (a) if the prosecutor is obligated to call the
witness, (b) if the witness is the opposite party, or
(c) if a witness suprises and harms the calling party's
case. Harm does not mean~ disappointment; it means
evidence that goes against your case, that is "aff irmatively" contrary to what was anticipated. If the witness says, "I don't remember," that is not harm within
the meaning of this rule.
MRE 607 does not leave the Michigan trial lawyer
totally without remedy against the disappointing
witness. The rule in Hileman v Indreica, 385 Mich 1; 187
NW2d 411 (1971), unaffected by MRE 607, states that an
examining attorney may seek to refresh his witness's
recollection by using prior statements of the witness.
Thus, Hileman affords some help in dealing with the
witness who surprises but does not harm or who harms
but does not surprise.
MRE 608 governs the use of character and conduct of a
witness as bearing on his credibility. Essentially, it
is a relevance problem. The fact that a person is deemed
to be generally honest (or dishonest) may make it more
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likely that he is (or is not) telling the truth this
time. But the rules set rather tight limits on these
kinds of proof. Relevance is a problem and there are
other considerable costs and problems involved. How do
we prove, in terms of character, that one is a truthful
or untruthful person? The time required for this kind
of pursuit may be excessive, and the possibility of
misuse by the jury is substantial. The necessary
limiting guidelines appear in MRE 608, which is similar
to the corresponding federal rule.
In the language of MRE 608(a) note the word
"reputation." This is where the Michigan rule differs
significantly from the federal rule. The federal rule
allows proof of character either by reputation or by
opm10n. The Michigan rule is more traditional and
limits proof of character to reputation. The federal
rule reflects the widely held feeling that even when
testimony is couched in terms of reputation most
witnesses (and most jurors) are thinking opinion; it is
one witness's opinion of another witness.
Recall the usual scenario:
Q.

A.

Q.
A.

Do you know witness A1 s reputation for truth and
veracity in the community in which he resides
and works?
Yes, I do.
What is that reputation?
It is bad. He has a bad reputation. Everybody
thinks he is a liar.

One other question is allowed in order to see what he
means by "bad":

Q.
A.

Based on that reputation, would you believe him
under oath?
No, sir.

That sounds like his opinion. Actually, the purpose
of the question is to see how bad that reputation isperhaps so bad that he should not be believed under
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oath. However, the general tenor is that of opinion
evidence, in practice if not in theory. The reputation
must be one for truthfulness or untruthfulness, not
for being a good person, or a law-abiding person, or a
peaceable person, or a moral person.
A witness's credibility may not be defended until it
has been attacked. One cannot put on Witness No. 1, have
him testify, and then call Witness No. 2 to say, "Witness No. 1 has a great reputation for truthfulness."
If the witness is attacked, however, then there may
be supporting or rehabilitating testimony. Ordinarily
mere contradiction of the testimony will not justify
support. For example, if my witness testifies that
the light was green and the other side testifies that
the light was red, I cannot now put in evidence that
my person is an honest person. I may not, because
contradiction is not an attack on credibility. However,
there are cases in which contradiction so carries the
implication of dishonesty that a court will call it
an attack on credibility and allow rehabilitation.
Suppose, for example, that Witness A states that he saw
defendant shoot the victim. Witness B, testifying for
the defense, states that he was with Witness A on that
day and that the two of them arrived at the scene after
the victim was already dead. That is a contradiction,
of course, but it is also susceptible to no other interpretation but that B is calling A a liar. Accordingly,
the cases tend to allow supportive, rehabil it at ing
testimony for Witness A to show that he has a good
reputation for truthfulness.
MRE 608(b) governs proof of specific instances of
bad conduct as bearing on credibility. The theory is
still the same: If a person is not a truthful person on
some occasions, he is less likely to be truthful this
time. To speak of a person's general reputation is
quite different from inquiring into specific incidents
in a person's life when he may have been dishonest.
The second sentence of 608(b) allows questions about
specific instances of conduct bearing on truthfulness.
For example, if I have some information that the
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witness filed a false income tax statement last year,
I may ask about it. But then, as provided in the first
sentence of 608(b), I must take the answer that I get.
If he denies it, I may not pursue the matter. The court
should not allow fishing expeditions, but rather should
require some showing at side bar that there is·a goodfaith basis for asking the question.
Until recently, there was a question in the Michigan
cases whether incidents inquired about had to bear on
honesty. Some cases in Michigan had held admissible
inquiry into misconduct showing that the witness was
not a moral person, without reference to honesty or
truthfulness as such. But People v Bouchee, 400 Mich
253; 253 NW2d 626 (1977), held that such inquiries
are limited to events that reflect on truthfulness.
In Bouchee the prosecutor sought to show that the
defendant who had testified had four children but was
not married. The Court said that having illegitimate
children is not relevant to honesty and that the
inquiry was therefore improper. MRE 608(b) underlines
the point.
The second paragraph of 608(b) provides that a
witness properly may assert a privilege against selfincrimination when being examined as to credibility.
This issue was previously unclear in Michigan law.
For example, if a witness is asked about a specific
instance of dishonest conduct under 608(b) (such as
"Did you cheat on your tax return?") and the question
bears only on credibility and not on the facts of the
case, the witness has not waived his privilege against
self-incrimination by-;egtifying thus far. Therefore,
he may refuse to answer the question if it is an otherwise appropriate claim of the privilege.
Let us turn now to the single most controversial
provision of all of these rules, MRE 609, which deals
with impeachment by showing a criminal conviction. When
Federal Rule 609 went through the Supreme Court of the
United States and then Congress, it generated more
commentary and more heat-not necessarily more lightthan any other single provision of the entire Federal
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Rules of Evidence. When it came to the Michigan committee, it evoked more hours of discussion than any other
rule. Every time the rule has been drafted, whether by
the Supreme Court committee, Congress, the House, the
Senate, the Michigan committee, or the Michigan Supreme
Court, it has been a compromise. The emotional nature
of the issues involved seems to demand a compromise,
and therefore no formulation of this rule is ever
totally acceptable to anyone.
The relevance of a conviction to credibility depends
upon the nature of the crime. If a conviction is for
an act of dishonesty, for example perjury, filing a
false income tax return, or embezzlement, the desired
inference is that the witness has been dishonest before
and it is likely that he is being dishonest now. This
rule resembles Rule 608(b), which authorizes inquiry
about specific instances bearing on truthfulness.
Under Rule 608(b), a lawyer cannot prove such instances
if denied; but under Rule 609 not only can he ask about
them, he can prove them. This is because, being of
record, the convict ion can be proved economically.
The witness probably will concede it, especially if
the record is in court; and if he won't concede it,
the record can be offered. The process of weighing
relevance against time, side issues, etc., is no
different from what it was under Rule 608(b); the
result is often different because not much time is
required and the conviction was of course based on a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt.
In addition, even if the offense does not involve
dishonesty, conviction of a crime indicates that the
witness is not law-abiding, is not a very moral person, or is a person who sometimes takes his obligations
to society 1 ight ly and therefore may be thought to take
his obligation to tell the truth in the courtroom a
little lightly also.
Rule 609 uses an amalgam of these ideas to define
the grounds of impeachment provided that the crime
was serious. Under Rule 609(a)(l), the crime used for
impeachment must be punishable by death or imprisonment
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in excess of one year, or it must involve theft, dishonesty, or false statement, regardless of the punishment. For example, a homicide conviction is admissible
to impeach even though the crime involved no dishonesty
or theft, and a shoplifting conviction, at the level of
a mere misdemeanor, is admissible because it is a crime
involving theft. (Incidentally, the word "theft" was
an insertion by the Michigan Supreme Court. The federal
rule simply says "dishonesty or false statement."
The Michigan Court clarified whether theft involves
dishonesty.)
Though the conviction meets the test of Rule
609(a)(l) as a felony and/or a crime of dishonesty,
under Rule 609( a) (2) it cannot be used to impeach
when the court determines that the probative value in
admitting this evidence on the issue of cred ib il ity
outweighs its prejudicial effect. The burden is on the
proponent-unlike the burden under Rule 403. Value on
the issue of credibility is measured against the danger
that the evidence will be misused by the fact finder.
Prejudice is obviously going to be greater when the
impeached witness is a party, and especially the
accused party in a criminal case. The convictions will
be especially damning and prejudicial if the prior
crime was the same kind of offense as that charged in
the instant case. This is an obvious time for a motion
in limine, under Rule 103(c), in order that defense
counsel may determine whether to place his client with
a record on the stand.
Rule 609(b) creates a ten-year "statute of limitations" on convictions counting usually from the time
the person was released from prison. The federal rule
gives the court some discretion to allow an older
conviction; the Michigan rule does not.
MRE 609(c) excludes proof of a conviction if there
has been a pardon, annulment, or the like.
A Michigan statute purports to make juvenile adjudications inadmissible for any purpose. MCLA 712A.23;
MSA 27.3178 (598.23). Rule 609(d), which supersedes the
statute, preserves that inadmissibility against the

ANALYSES OF THE RULES

205

accused himself. However, it permits use of juvenile
adjudications for other witnesses if it would be
admissible to attack the credibility of an adult, that
is, if it meets the tests of 609(a) and (b) and if the
court is satisfied that admission is necessary for a
fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
The rule is responsive to the constitutional concerns
expressed in Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308 (1974),
suggesting that due process requires that the defendant
be given an opportunity to confront the witnesses
against him and to explore their credibility.
Under 609(e), though the case is on appeal, the
conviction is still admissible, but the party appealing
can testify to prove that there is an appeal.
Rule 610 prohibits proof of religious beliefs or
opinions to impair or enhance credibility. Not prohibited, however, is evidence of religious affiliations
which have a bearing on bias or interest. For example,
suppose there is a will contest case in which Mrs. Jones
has died and left her estate to the First Baptist
Church. Her grandchildren attack the will on the ground
that she was not competent to make a will. Testifying
in support of the will is Mr. Johnson, an active member
of the First Baptist Church. Surely, such membership
bearing on bias can be shown.
Rule 707, though not in the "Witnesses" Article,
deals with impeachment of expert witnesses by use of
learned treatises. In the federal rules and in the
proposed Michigan rules, this provision without the
last six words was exception 18 of Hearsay Exception
Rule 803. It made learned treatises admissible as
substantive evidence. The Michigan Supreme Court
preferred the traditional approach, limiting the use of
treatises to impeachment purposes only. Hence Michigan
Rule 707. If the expert relied on a book on direct
examination, it can be used for impeachment on crossexamination. If he did not mention the book on direct,
it may be called to his attention on cross.
The other requirement of MRE 707 is that the work
from which the cross-examiner wishes to read "be
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established as a reliable authority by the testimony or
admission of the witness or by other expert testimony
or by judicial not ice • • • • "

Q.
A.

Is this an authority?
Yes, it is.

That would establish authority, as would another
witness's earlier testimony that the treatise is an
authority or the court's judicial notice of the work's
status. Then if the expert referred to it on direct or
if it was called to his attention on cross, it may be
used to impeach him; but the passages read are not
substantive evidence.

